A Dual Network Model Of Interlocking

Directorates by Hung, Humphry & Hong , Kong
Asian Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, 45–66, July 2003 
A DUAL NETWORK MODEL OF INTERLOCKING 
DIRECTORATES 
  
Humphry Hung 
Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
Hong Kong, China 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The article proposes an integrative framework for the study of interlocking directorates by 
using an approach that encompasses the concepts of multiple networks and resource 
endowment.  This serves to integrate the traditional views of interorganizational linkages and 
intra-class cohesion. Through appropriate strategic analysis of relevant resource endowment 
of internal environment and external networks of organizations and corporate elites, this 
article argues that the selection of directors, if used effectively, can be adopted as a strategic 
device to enhance the corporation's overall performance. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mainstream management literature distinguishes at least two different approaches in 
studying interlocking directorates: interorganizational coordination (Podolny & Baron, 
1997; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000) and intraclass 
cooperation (Useem, 1984; Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 
1997).  Although attempts have been made to integrate these two distinct areas of 
studies into one (Palmer, 1983; Ornstein, 1984; Belliveau, O'Reilly & James, 1996; 
Westphal, 1998; Dyer & Noboeka, 2000), an all-inclusive theory or model is yet to be 
developed.   
 
The difficulty of integrating these two approaches may be attributable to the fact that 
interorganizational coordination focuses on organizations while intraclass co-
operation uses people, especially corporate elites, as the unit of analysis (Fligstein, 
1995; David, Rahul & Levitas, 1998; Gulati & Garguilo, 1999). The former is 
basically an economic explication emphasizing the exchanges of resources among 
organizations while the latter is primarily a social concern of the domination of the 
elite class.  A valid theory of interlocking directorates should be able to explicate both 
the economic and social aspects of how and why directors interlock (Bian, 1997; Dyer 
& Noboeka, 2000). 
  
This article attempts to propose a new perspective for the study of interlocking 
directorates.   It is argued that a board of directors can be regarded as a strategic 
institutional device of an organization to extend and consolidate the business as well 
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as interpersonal networks of the top management of the organization.  The resource 
endowment of interlocking directors, rather than the organizations or the directors 
themselves as members of the elite class, will be the unit of analysis in this article.  
The resource endowment, which is partly explained in terms of resource-based theory, 
will be used to rationalize the network process as well as dyadic relationship of 
organizations through interlocking directorates.  Personal resources of directors, 
expressed in terms of the relative position within their interpersonal networks, are 
also regarded as significant in addition to the roles of directors as agents for 
maintaining interorganizational linkages or class rationality (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; 
Gulati & Garguilo, 1999).    
  
This article focuses on two most important networks: interorganizational networks 
and corporate elite's interpersonal networks.  Directors' relative positions in these two 
networks, which may give rise to their influence on other members in the networks, 
will enhance their resource endowment.  This will further consolidate the power and 
influence of the directors concerned.  Using these two networks to describe the 
structure (how directors interlock) and directors' resource endowment to analyze the 
process (why directors interlock), a new dual network model of interlocking 
directorates is proposed.  Propositions and implications on theory development and 
research, as well as strategic management will also be presented. 
 
Terminology 
 
A few terms will need to be clarified before we proceed with the discussion of the 
proposed interlocking model.  The corporations which the directors own or are 
employed as full-time executive directors are termed in this article as directors' 
primary corporations.  Those directors sitting on the governing boards of other 
corporations are referred to as interlocking corporations (Westphal, 1999).  Directors' 
organizational resource endowment refers to those resources that are possessed by the 
directors' primary organizations and may be managed or controlled by these directors.  
Directors' personal resource endowment includes those tangible and intangible 
resources that are possessed by individual directors (Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998).  
An example of tangible resources are shareholdings, through which a person endowed 
with capital becomes a director of the company (Fligstein, 1995; Westphal, 1998).  
Intangible resources are professional expertise or experience, social status or political 
influence of directors. Outbound directors are the CEOs, executive directors or 
members of the management team of a corporation, who serve as non-executive 
directors of interlocking corporations other than affiliated companies or subsidiaries 
of their primary corporations.  Inbound directors are outside directors who have no 
direct relationship with the incumbent organizations. 
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THE DUAL NETWORK MODEL 
 
In simplest words, when a person sits on the boards of directors of two or more 
corporations, these corporations are said to have interlocking directorates (Mariolis & 
Jones, 1982; Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997; Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000).   
As discussed earlier, interlocking directorates have been studied with respect to two 
major perspectives: interorganizational coordination and intraclass cooperation.   
 
The interorganizational approach uses interlocks as indicators of corporate control, 
intercorporate cohesion or community of interest, and interorganizational resource 
dependency (Mizruchi, 1982).  Interlocks therefore function as a form of co-optation 
mechanism, a device for intercorporate power and influence, and channels of 
communication among corporations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Zaheer, McEvily & 
Perrone, 1997; Dyer & Noboeka, 2000).  An organization will interlock with other 
organizations through its directors as long as the interlocks are economically viable 
and beneficial to the organization.  The unit of analysis is organizations and their 
networks.  The focus of study is the structure of the networks and dyadic interaction 
between two interlocking organizations.  The degree to which a corporation is 
interlocked may be seemed as the magnitude of its interdependence with other 
corporations (Mizruchi, 1982; Belliveau, O'Reilly & James, 1996; Zaheer, McEvily & 
Perrone, 1997; Gulati & Singh, 1998).   
 
The second approach treats the interlocking directorates as a social phenomenon of 
expressing and maintaining class solidarity (Ornstein, 1984; Doz, 1996).  It is a means 
of social, political and ideological coordination of corporate elite (Useem, 1984; 
Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1997).  The unit of analysis is the elites in modern 
capitalist societies and the study focuses on the extent class cohesion and class-wide 
coordinated action is upheld by interlocking directorates (Useem, 1984; Dyer & 
Noboeka, 2000). 
  
The fundamental diversity between these two approaches to the study of interlocking 
directorates originates from the differences in terms of their units of analysis and 
degree of institutionalization and socialization of directors.  The interorganizational 
coordination approach focuses on economic exchanges of resources among 
organizations (Fligstein, 1995; David, Rahul & Levitas, 1998; Gulati & Singh, 1998).  
Directors, according to this approach, are acting mainly as agents that initiate and 
facilitate the dyadic exchanges of economic resources between one organization and 
another.  They are sometimes described as "co-optive corporate actors" (Burt, 1980: 
582). Socialization of the directors and institutionalization of their organizations is 
unlikely to fall within the scope of the study.  The structure of interlocking 
directorates will be expressed in terms of institutional networks that organizations 
participate in order to obtain valuable organization-based resources.    
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The intraclass cooperation approach uses corporate elites as the unit of analysis.  Its 
primary concern is the extent to which the socialization of this group of elite may 
have effect on the society at large and the policy in general.  Organizations are media 
through which the corporate elite obtains social status and political power (Bian, 1997; 
Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 1998).  The personal attributes 
of directors, expressed in terms of their social status in the elite class, are prerequisite 
conditions for participating in the interlocking directorate networks (Bian, 1997; 
David, Rahul & Levitas, 1998).  These networks are institutional channels and means 
to socialize the corporate directors in favor of the elite class.  The directors, in return 
for their acceptance into the elite class, act as agents to preserve the class interests 
through director interlocks (Westphal, 1999).   
 
Table 1 shows a comparison between the interorganizational coordination approach 
and the intraclass cooperation approach to the study of interlocking directorates.  The 
comparative analysis may cast some insights into the possibility of integrating these 
two approaches into a unified framework for theory development.  This is in fact the 
theme of this article and will be done by adopting a resource-based view with a focus 
on the resource endowment of directors as the unit of analysis. 
 
TABLE 1  
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION APPROACH  
AND THE INTRACLASS COOPERATION APPROACH TO INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 
 
 Interorganizational coordination 
approach 
Intraclass cooperation  
approach 
Unit of analysis Organizations Corporate elite 
Directors' major role 
 
Control, obtain resources and 
exchange information 
Preserve class interests 
 
Analytical framework Economic analysis Social analysis 
Socialization of directors Less concern Much concern 
Director networks Exchanges of resources For socialization 
Emphasis of directors'  
   attributes  
Organizational Personal and social 
 
Significance of Resources 
 
The proposed model in this article emphasizes two important elements: resources and 
networks. Organizations cannot survive without the availability of appropriate 
resources.  The strategies by which organizations seek resources from various sources 
have become a major area of organizational research (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Burt, 
1997; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997).  Resources, in this context, refer to something more 
than the traditional economic meaning of factors of production, which comprise land, 
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capital and labor.  They also include financial resources (e.g. cash flow, debts), 
physical resources (e.g. plant and equipment), human resources (e.g. workers, 
management team), organizational resources (e.g. corporate culture and routines), 
technological resources (e.g. quality, state-of-the-art skills) and intangible resources 
(e.g. reputation, goodwill) (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, 
1998; Podolny & Baron, 1997; Gulati, 1999).  These resources are imperative for 
sustaining competitive advantages.  Resource-based theory, according to Porter (1991: 
107), argues that "the origins of competitive advantage are valuable resources that 
firms possess".  It is portrayed as a theory of strategy (Prahalad & Hamel, 1991; 
Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996) and many major strategic reasoning may have 
been interpreted in light of a resource-based perspective (Wernerfelt, 1995).  
According to the theory, the uniqueness of a firm is defined by its bundle of resources 
which account for its success, rather than the products it offers (Wernerfelt, 1995; 
Porter, 1991).  What makes resources valuable will be their superiority for internal 
use, and relative difficulty in imitating and substituting (Wernerfelt, 1984; Porter, 
1991).  There is therefore an implied fundamental causal relationship between 
resources possessed or endowed by a firm, and its activities as well as performance.  
A firm can only grow and diversify successively by striking a balance between 
exploitation of existing resources and development of new resources (Wernerfelt, 
1984).  That is why the resource-based view is said to contribute significantly to the 
studies on diversification strategy (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992) and motivation for 
growth (Penrose, 1959).  It also presents an opportunity for possible communication 
and integration among various research perspectives (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). 
  
For the study of interlocking directorates, a special application of the resource-based 
view which focuses on the interdependency of organizational resources has been used 
quite frequently (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Rowley,  
Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000).  This resource dependency approach proposes that 
interlocking directorates are "one form of a more general tendency to manage the 
environment by appointing significant external representatives to positions in the 
organization" (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  The process is commonly known as "co-
optation", which is a strategy for securing resources, exchanging information, and 
establishing intercorporate cooperation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Mariolis & Jones, 
1982; Fligstein, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1997).  Such a resource 
dependency view suggests that directors sit inside the boardroom to act merely as 
agents to facilitate exchanges of organizational resources and information.  They do 
not necessarily have real power in making strategic decisions of their corporations 
and an effective co-optation strategy means that an organization should ensure that 
these directors do not have real decision-making power (Selznick, 1957).  A resource 
dependency view of interlocking directorates has given rise to propositions that had 
been empirically tested and verified (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Mariolis & Jones, 
1982; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997).  The performance of organizations is believed to be 
associated with the appointment of representatives from financial institutions as 
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directors (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988).  Within director networks, the centrality of 
banks is therefore more stable than the centrality of non-banks because of the 
dependency on financial resources for most organizations (Mariolis & Jones, 1982; 
Gulati, 1999; David, Rahul & Levitas, 1998).   
 
A pure resource dependency view of interlocking directorates has raised some 
concerns.  The connotation of interorganizational linkages as a unique and exhaustive 
function of directors' interlocks is challenged by many researchers.  Studies on the 
reconstitution of broken ties of interlocking directorates do not support the 
assumptions about the need to maintain the connective and directional continuity of 
interlock ties to facilitate formal coordination among organizations (Palmer, 1983; 
Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).  Zajac (1988: 428) 
observes that "it is not obvious that board members with two or more directorships 
actually function as interorganizational linkages".  Ornstein (1984) reported that at 
least half the interlocking directorates from 1946 to 1977 in Canada reflected class 
solidarity.  Interorganizational resource dependency seems to provide only a partial 
solution for the comprehension of the complexity of interlocking directorates. 
    
Directors' Resource Endowment 
 
This article proposes to use directors' resource endowment to extend as well as 
improve the arguments of the resource dependency theory of interlocking directorates.  
The resource dependency view suggests that directors are invited to sit inside the 
boardroom of an organization because they represent external organizations which 
possess valuable resources that can make significant contributions to the performance 
of the organization.  For the interorganizational coordination to be effective, these 
directors must have notable influences on the allocation of resources of the 
organizations that are in possession of these resources (Burt, 1997; Walker, Kogut & 
Shan, 1997; Gulati & Garguilo, 1999).  From a resource-based perspective, these 
organizational resources as represented by directors can be expressed in terms of 
organizational resource endowment possessed by these directors.  It means that these 
directors do not actually or necessarily own these resources but they may have a 
certain degree of discretion to control or influence the use of these resources by virtue 
of their management position.  According to the resource dependency theory, the 
organizational resource endowment may be the most important consideration for the 
selection and appointment of directors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
  
Building upon and extending the resource dependency view of interlocking 
directorates, this article argues that the contributions of directors to a corporation are 
not necessarily attributable solely to their organizational resource endowment but may 
in many cases be associated with the personal attributes of these directors in addition 
to their shareholdings (Fligstein, 1995; Westphal, 1999).   The professional and 
business expertise, social status and political influence of directors as individuals 
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instead of organizational representatives can have significant benefit to an 
organization.  These attributes may very often contribute a lot to the quality of 
decisions made by the board of directors.  In addition, their positions in the corporate 
elites' interpersonal networks also contribute toward their influence over other 
members in the networks.  This type of power and influence can add value to the 
resources endowed with the individuals.  Following the line of argument of a 
resource-based view, the personal attributes of directors, which may be valuable to an 
organization, can be expressed in terms of their personal resource endowment.  This 
type of endowment is specific to the individual directors and is not transferable.  This 
additional dimension will supplement the resource dependency view by proposing 
that the consideration of the appointment of directors also relies on their personal 
resource endowment in addition to their organizational resource endowment.  The 
directors can contribute toward the achievement of objectives of an organization not 
merely by virtue of the resources of corporations they represent, but also their 
personal resources such as skills, knowledge or social status. 
 
Furthermore, it is posited that valuable resources are endowed by organizations as 
well as individuals and are intertwined in complex economic and social networks (cf.: 
Rowley,  Behrens & Krackhardt, 2000).  It will be necessary to assess in the first 
place what resources, organizational or personal, are actually required by a 
corporation. This resource specificity requirement enables the organization to 
evaluate the need of and thus search for directors with relevant resource endowment. 
An appropriate selection of directors to the boardroom with particular reference to 
their resource endowment can therefore ensure that the organization can have a 
greater likelihood of accessing to and utilizing these valuable resources.  A board of 
directors can then be used strategically to achieve the objectives of a corporation by 
placing itself appropriately within the networks of interlocking directorates (Fligstein, 
1995; Bian, 1997).  Network analysis of directors' resource endowment therefore 
offers valuable insights for a more thorough understanding of how and why directors 
interlock.  
 
Significance of Networks 
 
Networks are commonly perceived as a coordination process among individuals in 
addition to markets and hierarchies (Powell, 1990).  The essence of the network 
theory is that the behavior and performance of a single firm could be understood only 
in terms of its relational setting (Benassi, 1995; Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Noboeka, 2000).   
Individual action is defined as being generated within a knitted set of relational 
opportunities and constraints, rather than as being attached to individual attributes.  
The theory is used to describe the structure, process and governance mechanism of 
the exchanges which occurs in networks.  Network analysis focuses on the 
interdependence of actors and how their positions in networks influence their 
opportunities, constraints and behavior (Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1994; Gulati, 
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1999).  The structure of the network and the actor's position in the network, which 
determines its action and behavior, has become the focus of many researches  
(Mizruchi, 1984; Scott & Griff, 1984; Dyer, 1996). 
  
Organizations are believed to link to each other in the form of corporate networks 
through interlocking directorates.  Within the networks, organizations are linked in 
two major ways: direct and indirect interlocking (Burt, 1980; Daily, 1996).  Direct 
interlocking occurs when full-time senior executives or executive directors of a 
corporation act as directors of external organizations.  Indirect interlocking refers to 
the situation when the common directors of two interlocking corporations are not full-
time executives of both organizations (Burt, 1980). Organizational networks of 
interlocking directorates are traditionally perceived as a unitary type of networks.  
The main focus of studies is either the dyadic relationship between organizations or 
the structure of the interorganizational networks.  Personal attributes or power, and 
thus person-related contributions of directors, rather than being representatives of 
corporations, are seldom included in the studies.   This undersocialized approach to 
the study of interlocking directorates fails to take into account the influence of the 
corporate elites' networks.    
 
Dual Network Model 
 
The assertion of a single corporate network in a certain society may only be valid 
under a very broad generalization and assumption (Mizruchi, 1982).   The complexity 
of interorganizational networks in America or any other economies is far beyond the 
limits of the explanatory power of the single corporate network assumption (Daily, 
1996; Dyer & Noboeka, 2000).  However, there is no intention whatsoever to say here 
that a single network approach is theoretically invalid.  To do that requires extensive 
empirical studies which are yet to be carried out.  This article proposes to use two 
networks rather than a single network approach to the study of interlocking 
directorates based on the justification that multiple networks can have more 
explanatory power and propositions. Thus a dual network approach is more 
convincing than a single network approach.    
 
It is argued that there are in fact two, not one, major categories of networks that need 
to be considered: interorganizational networks and corporate elites' interpersonal 
networks.   Each category of networks comprises many different types of smaller 
networks.  There are interorganizational networks among banks, industry-specific or 
not-for-profit organizations (Gulati, 1998).  At the same time there are specialized 
interpersonal networks for businessmen, professionals or directors of larger 
corporations (Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1997; Gulati 
& Singh,  1998).  This approach stipulates that organizations are not directly tied to 
each other but are linked through interlocking directorates to form various types of 
interorganizational networks.  At the same time these directors, being corporate elite, 
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form different types of interpersonal networks among themselves.   These networks 
link together groups of corporate elite who are described by Useem (1984) as being 
the "inner circle". Both interorganizational networks and corporate elites' 
interpersonal networks are parameters that need to be looked into. 
  
 
PROPOSITIONS 
 
We use a network and resource endowment approach to the study of interlocking 
directorates.  Propositions are made with reference to three aspects.  First, the most 
fundamental proposition is the assertion that corporations appoint directors based on 
their resource endowment that may be of value to the corporations.  Second, the 
interorganizational linkages are analyzed by using international economic 
perspectives.  The concept of comparative advantage is adopted and organizational 
resource endowment is used as the determinant of the pattern and direction of 
interlocking.  The effect of competition on interlocking organizations is also studied 
to highlight the significance of resource endowment.  Finally, the correlation between 
interpersonal networks and interorganizational networks is investigated by 
concentrating on the centrality of, as well as the level of competition between these 
networks.     
 
Fundamental Proposition 
 
Attempts have been made in this article to incorporate a resource endowment view 
into the network theory of interorganizational and interpersonal linkages and thus 
facilitate the analysis of the origin and dynamics of interlocking directorates.   The 
use of directors' resource endowment within the interorganizational networks and 
corporate elites' interpersonal networks provides a framework for the analysis (Zaheer,  
McEvily & Perrone, 1997).  Corporations will appoint inbound directors with 
resource endowment that is relatively deficient in these corporations.   Contrary to a 
resource dependency view, the concerned resource endowment of the directors will 
include personal resources in addition to organizational resources.  These resources 
should be perceived by corporations to be able to add value to the competitive 
advantages of the corporations or to the advantages of their senior managers or 
executive directors personally. This provides the basis for the first and most 
fundamental proposition of the dual network model of interlocking directorates. 
 
Proposition 1: Inbound directors of a corporation will be likely in possession of 
at least one resource that is relatively less endowed by the 
corporation or its senior executives. 
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Interorganizational Linkages  
 
The dyadic relationship between organizations in interorganizational networks are 
analyzed by adopting an international economic approach (Walker, Kogut & Shan, 
1997). There are certain similarities between a country and a corporation in terms of 
their interactions with other countries and corporations respectively.  Theories and 
models of international trade have helped a lot in understanding the dyadic trading 
relationship between two nations.  An attempt is made here to adopt an international 
economic approach for the comprehension of the interaction of resource endowment 
and interorganizational networks.  This will make possible the construction of 
empirically testable propositions which may be the subject of possible further 
research.  Using an analogy between a country and a corporation, as well as 
international trade and interlocking directorates, it is observed that there are certain 
notable similarities between the imports and exports of a country and inbound and 
outbound directors of a corporation (although the latter is slightly more complicated 
by the intertwining of personal and organizational resource endowment).   According 
to international economics, factor endowment determines the type of imports and 
exports  of a country.  The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem of trade states that countries will 
export those goods whose production is relatively intensive in the factors which they 
are well endowed (Ohlin, 1933).  Putting into the context of interlocking directorates, 
organizations will "export" those outbound directors who represent the resources that 
are relatively better endowed by the organizations.  These resources are not solely 
organizational but in many cases personal.   This gives rise to the second proposition. 
 
Proposition 2:  The demand for outbound directors of a corporation by other 
interlocking corporations is positively associated with the 
relative abundance of organizational resources endowed with 
the primary corporation as well as personal resources of its 
management teams as compared with that of the other 
interlocking corporations. 
 
Centrality 
 
A larger number of outbound directors with more number of directorship in external 
organizations will mean that the primary organization concerned has a relatively 
central position in the interorganizational network (Pennings, 1980; Gulati, 1998).  
Proposition 2 suggests that with more resource endowment, more outbound directors 
are likely to be demanded by other corporations.  The density and centrality of a 
network is thus directly associated with the degree of resource asymmetry within the 
network.  Hopkins (1964) reported that centrality could be regarded as a strong 
predictor of influence and leadership. Directors endowed with abundant 
organizational or personal resources are likely to be more influential than others 
(Gulati, 1999; Dyer & Noboeka, 2000). 
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Proposition 3:  An organization will have a greater likelihood to achieve a 
higher level of centrality in the interlocking directorates 
networks if it has a relatively higher level of resources. 
 
The resources concerned include both organizational and personal.  This proposition 
suggests that banks and insurance companies with more financial resource 
endowment are more likely to have a higher level of centrality in the interlocking 
directorate networks.  This is in line with the empirical studies performed by Mizruchi 
(1982), and Scott and Griff (1984).   
 
Interpersonal Networks 
 
Corporate directors are described as corporate elites and are in favor of class-wide 
benefits which involve "considerations that lead to company decisions beneficial to 
all large companies, even when there is no discernible, direct gain for the individual 
firm", in addition to business decisions (Useem, 1984).  A corporation cannot operate 
entirely on its own.  In selecting inbound directors, the persons' standing within the 
broader corporate community is increasingly a factor of concern (Useem, 1984; 
Belliveau, O'Reilly & James, 1996; Gulati & Singh, 1998). Since organizational 
resource endowment is an important attribute of corporate elites, senior managers and 
executive directors of corporations with more organizational resource endowment 
will be relatively more in demand to become outbound directors (Bian, 1997).  
Accordingly their social status within the corporate elites' networks will very likely be 
enhanced.  They will therefore more likely have a higher level of centrality in the 
elites' networks.  
 
Proposition 4:  A corporation with a relatively high level of centrality in its 
interorganizational network due to more abundant 
organizational resource endowment will have a greater 
likelihood of having outbound directors with a relatively high 
level of centrality in their interpersonal networks. 
  
Competing Organizations 
 
Organizations tend to maintain its autonomy in the same way as a country striving for 
national independence. Those organizations with relatively more resource endowment 
will be more eager to protect their interests than those with less resource endowment.  
This explains why in certain cases supposedly competing corporations are willing to 
cooperate in industries such as the tobacco industry to protect their common interests.  
The dual networks model however argues that, unless there are statutory provisions or 
restrictions, corporations will have interlocking directorates irrespective of whether 
they are competitors or not.  This is supported by Galaskiewicz and his colleagues 
(1985) who observe that there is no significant interlocking among competing firms 
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based on the locale of sales.  Firms interlock because of the need to obtain 
comparative advantages through the coordination of inbound and outbound 
directorship.  This leads to the fifth proposition: 
 
Proposition 5:   Other than the consideration of resource endowment and legal 
restrictions, directly competing corporations will have no more 
and no less likelihood to interlock through their directors as 
compared to non-competing corporations. 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The implications of the dual network model are presented in two aspects: implications 
on further studies and impacts on strategic management. Implications for further 
studies will be discussed with reference to the ability to integrate existing theories of 
interorganizational coordination and intraclass cooperation.   Development of theories 
and researches arising from the proposed model will also be presented. The dual 
network model provides a framework for strategic management of boards of directors.  
The analysis of resource endowment is important and consequential because only by 
understanding the internal strength and weakness of an organization can strategies be 
formulated meaningfully.  The model proposes that a board of directors can be 
regarded as a strategic device of a corporation to influence and obtain resources 
through the business and interpersonal networks of directors.  The choice of networks 
is therefore critical for the interlocking to be effective.  The selection of inbound 
directors and external corporations for outbound directors can be used to achieve the 
strategic goals of the organizations.  
 
Implications for Further Studies 
 
The dual network model proposed in this article may serve to reconcile a resource 
dependency view and a class cohesion perspective of interlocking directorates. 
Directors' resource endowment, both organizational and personal, is used in the dual 
network model as a factor to rationalize why directors can be used as a means to 
facilitate interorganizational linkages. Interorganizational networks and corporate 
elites' interpersonal networks are intertwined in a complex way with the former 
accounting for interorganizational coordination and the latter explaining the class 
rationality of corporate elites (Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997; Rowley, Behrens & 
Krackhardt, 2000).   This paves a way for integrating the two common approaches to 
the study of interlocking directorates.  As a start, this article highlights one major 
factor or medium, directors' resource endowment, as a common thread for 
understanding how the interorganizational networks and corporate elites' 
interpersonal networks interact with each other.  The integration process can be 
56 
A dual network model of interlocking directorates 
further enhanced and intensified by analyzing the significance of the various types of 
resources endowed. 
 
It is proposed that a dual network approach taking into consideration of directors' 
resource endowment can convincingly explain the phenomenon of interlocking 
directorates.  The approach thus refutes the idea of a single network of directors' 
interlocking as a medium for either interorganizational linkages or intraclass 
cooperation.  This theoretical idea can be more fine-tuned and extended to other 
levels of organizations, such as internal informal groups, supplier-customer 
relationship etc.  A resource endowment view is used in this article to elucidate the 
causes and motivation of members to participate in networks.  Attempts have been 
made by some scholars to include resource-based theory as a fifth branch of 
organizational economic theory, along with agency theory, transaction cost 
economics, property rights and evolutionary economics (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; 
Belliveau, O'Reilly & James, 1996; Doz, 1996; Dyer & Noboeka, 2000).  For the 
study of interlocking directorates, resources-based theory has shown its explanatory 
power (Gulati & Singh, 1998).  It may be time for an overall evaluation of the theory 
with a view to strengthening its theoretical stance and recognition in management 
literature. 
 
Several empirically testable propositions have been proposed in this article.  These 
propositions reflect the principal arguments and deduction of the dual network model 
of interlocking directorates.   Research may be designed and formatted to verify these 
propositions and it is hoped that other studies may also be carried out.   While the 
structure of interorganizational networks have been studied quite extensively 
(Pennings, 1980; Useem, 1984; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996), corporate 
elites' interpersonal networks are still awaiting for exploration.  Network analysis may 
be used for the purpose of understanding the pattern and content of the interaction that 
may take place among corporate elites as social units (Nelson, 1989; Stuart, 1998).  
This will facilitate the comprehension of the scope, dimension, extent of influence of 
these networks. The importance of individual resources, both organizational and 
personal, to the consideration of appointing inbound directors to organizations may be 
another area for further study.  A factor analysis of specific resources endowed by 
directors, if carefully planned and structured will give some insight into the extent of 
influence of  the resources concerned. 
 
Strategic Management of Boards of Directors 
 
The dual network model proposed in this article suggests that the resource 
endowment of an organization and its senior executives should be carefully and 
extensively analyzed. This should be done with special reference to the 
interorganizational networks in which the organization embeds and corporate elites' 
interpersonal networks that may affect the senior executives of the organization 
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(Belliveau, O'Reilly & James, 1996; Bian, 1997; Stuart, 1998).  With a thorough 
understanding of the level of its resource endowment, an organization can then make 
use of the competitive advantage which arise from such endowment.  Surplus or 
deficiency in resources may to some extent be utilized, balanced or compensated 
through participating in dual networks of interorganizational linkages as well as 
corporate elites ties.  Strategic analysis can help define which networks the 
organization should participate.  An appropriate selection of networks and directors 
are therefore an important and challenging task for the organization to strategically 
manage its environment (Gulati & Singh, 1998). 
 
Strategic Use of Boards of Directors 
 
A board of directors can be a powerful tool in the strategic management process.  
Hung (1998) identified six roles of board of directors: link, coordinate, control, 
strategise, maintain and support.  These roles serve to assist the organizations to 
achieve their corporate objectives.  Directors' resource endowment will be imperative 
for their governing boards to fulfill their roles effectively (Burt, 1997; Stuart, 1998; 
Gulati & Garguilo, 1999).  With an appropriate mix of directors, an organization can 
maximize the utilization of the networks it embeds or intends to penetrate.  Board 
composition can be used as a device to enhance competitive advantages through 
acquiring comparative advantages of resource endowment by interlocking directorates.   
A board of director is actually a low-cost reservoir of resources and also channels for 
the corporation to gain access to relevant organizational networks and senior 
executives of the organization to reach appropriate corporate elites' networks. 
 
Strategic Use of Networks 
 
The dual network model posits that both interorganizational and corporate elites 
networks are channels for organizations to acquire valuable resources through 
interlocking directorates.  The choice of networks for an organization should reflect 
its demand for resources.  Appropriate interorganizational networks can facilitate 
exchange of tangible resources such as finance, raw material, supplies and equipment, 
and intangible resources such as technology and skills (Uzzi, 1997; Gulati & Singh, 
1998; Gulati, 1999).  Relevant corporate elites' networks can help the organization 
build up its reputation, fame as well as legitimacy.  According to the proposed model, 
appropriate choices and uses of the two important networks of interlocking 
directorates can improve chances of organizational performance and thus its survival. 
 
Strategic Use of Inbound Directors:  Interlocked by Whom   
 
A resource dependency view suggests that inbound directors can be used as a means 
to obtain valuable organizational resources and co-opt potential threats of external 
organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Doz, 1996; Uzzi, 1997).  This article extends 
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the meaning of the resources to include personal reputation and expertise of directors.  
Through inbound directors, not only can an organization make use of the resource 
endowment of these directors, but it can also gain access to the corporate elite 
networks which these directors belong.  The opportunity of obtaining the resources 
and reaching networks of inbound directors depends on how an organization can 
strategically manage these directors.  Board meeting take place only a few times each 
year and interaction between senior executives of an organization and its inbound 
directors is occasional.  Measures should be taken to ensure these board meetings will 
be held more frequently and more fruitful discussion may be made by the provision of 
more relevant information by the management of the organization (Daily, 1996; 
Belliveau, O'Reilly & James, 1996; Dyer & Noboeka, 2000).  The use of committees 
such as management committees, audit committees or finance committees can 
maximize the utilization of inbound directors by involving them more in the decision-
making process as well as socializing them (Dyer, 1996; Walker, Kogut & Shan, 
1997).  These inbound directors should preferably be invited to participate in the 
social activities of the senior executives of the organization to foster more intimate 
informal linkages. 
 
Strategic Use of Outbound Directors: Whom to Interlock   
 
Resource endowment may serve to explain why corporations appoint relevant 
inbound directors in order to obtain valuable resources endowed by these directors.  It 
can also account for the motivation of organizations and their senior managers to 
become directors of other organizations (Bian, 1997).  Outbound directors may serve 
a number of purposes in favor of their primary corporations.  According to a resource 
endowment perspective, these outbound directors may serve the objectives of 
protecting, sustaining and enhancing their organizational resource endowment by 
controlling the interlocking corporations, and at the same time consolidating their 
personal resource endowment within the corporate elite networks by being the 
director of a sufficient number of corporations.  More specifically, it can be used as a 
means to control or monitor the behavior of external companies by influencing the 
decisions made in the boardroom of these organizations (Daily, 1996; Burt, 1997).  
Second, outbound directors can serve the purpose of exchanging information among 
organizations.  Technologies, skills and expertise can be solicited from interlocking 
corporations through outbound directors (Uzzi, 1997; Gulati & Singh, 1998).  Third, 
these directors can assist in upholding the interests of their primary organizations.   
This accounts for the phenomenon that representatives of financial institutions very 
often take up some seats in the boardrooms of corporations which they have granted 
substantial amount of loans.    
 
 
 
Concluding Comments 
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This article contributes to theories and researches on interlocking directorates by 
providing a framework for studying the influence of directors' resource endowment 
on interorganizational networks and corporate elites' interpersonal networks.   
Traditional studies on interlocking directorates focus on the structure of either the 
interorganizational linkages through directors' interlocks or the phenomenon of class-
wide rationality through cooperation among corporate elites (Burt, 1997; Walker, 
Kogut & Shan, 1997; Gulati, 1999).  The organizational networks and corporate 
elites' interpersonal networks are considered incompatible in terms of theory 
development and empirical research.  The proposed dual networks model moves 
beyond this type of traditional analysis and integrates the influence of these two major 
types of networks to account for interlocking directorates. 
  
Strategic management of board of directors is also suggested.  The need for strategic 
analysis of the resource endowment of the incumbent organization is a prerequisite 
condition for a strategic use of boards.  A careful selection of both organizational and 
corporate elites' interpersonal networks may pave the way for an appropriate choice 
of inbound directors.  Based on the model, board effectiveness should be measured by 
the extent the governing board has contributed toward the response of the 
organization in meeting the challenge of the environment.  An appropriate board 
composition can provide considerable contributions to the performance of the 
organization. 
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